

THREE LEVELS OF ANTHROPOLOGICAL OBJECTION TO EVOLUTION

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Anthropologists disagree among themselves about any particular application of evolutionary explanation. Yet they tend to accept without question the general idea of evolution. The data of evolution can be shown to be either borrowed or generated by the assumptions. The uniformitarian assumptions of an existent order can be shown to be inconsistent with an attempt to explain the origins of that order. Evolution succeeds only in deifying nature by placing within it the inscrutable mystery which is beyond science and the human mind. Its deifying treatment of material nature is a value position and not a scientific theory.

For good reason many people, laymen and professionals, have identified anthropology with evolution. To speak of anthropological objections to evolution will sound to many persons like scientific objections to science. What is more generally expected is religious or Biblical objections to evolution. Unfortunately, all too many of the religious objections to evolution have been based more in human emotions and traditions than in the Scriptures and as a result have generated far more heat than light.

If I seem incongruous or presumptuous to some in presenting anthropological objections to evolution, I would ask the reader to consider the following two facts about anthropology and anthropologists.

First, that while almost no anthropologist questions evolution, there is no particular evolutionary explanation offered by one anthropologist that is not opposed by some others. This is true in both physical and cultural anthropology.

The second observation is that, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, many cultural anthropologists of the United States and many social anthropologists of Great Britain either opposed evolution or did not regard it as a useful framework of explanation. Leslie White¹ says of this period, "... an important turn of events took place in anthropological circles: a vigorous reaction against evolutionist theory set in. In America this movement was led by Franz Boas." We see then that objections to evolution in general and to any specific evolutionary explanation is and has been registered from within anthropology.

It must be recognized, however, that the framework of evolution is today increasingly the "vogue" within anthropology. White's work is a strong reaction against the anti-evolutionary reaction of the first part of this century. His work in a context of many other factors has greatly minimized, if not eliminated, the anti-evolutionary direction of anthropology today. In fact, explicit overt opposition to evolution is most liable to be met by suspicions of the individual's ignorance of the data, of biased or uneducated

reasoning, or of a superstitious opposition to science.

And yet, it is on these three levels that I wish to raise what I hope to show are anthropological objections to evolution. These objections are anthropological because:

(1) They are openly concerned with the problem of data;

(2) They are consciously concerned with the exercise of reason;

(3) They are committed to the scientific criteria of theory.

I shall use a cultural anthropologist's definition of evolution as applicable also to biological phenomena: "Evolution may be defined as a temporal sequence of forms: one form grows out of another; culture advances from one stage to another."² Evolution also attempts to link the stages of the nonliving to the stages of life. The stages of life are also linked to the stages of culture. The whole process is used to account supposedly for the existing order of nature and man.

Two other concepts that are basic to the understanding of my objections are found in the adjectives: synchronic and diachronic. **Synchronic** has reference to a continuing order of phenomena. This is the approach of natural scientists by which the same regularities which are observed today, probably occurred yesterday and will occur tomorrow. $\text{HCl} + \text{NaOH} \longrightarrow \text{H}_2\text{O} + \text{NaCl}$ is a chemical change which was true one hundred years ago and may be expected to be true one hundred years hence. Time, we observe, is not a factor even though it is involved in the process. The synchronic approach then is an approach to an existent predictable order.

Diachronic has reference to temporal processes. It is the approach of historians to change in the state or organization of orders. The amount of salt or salts in the oceans is observed to change over time. The history of this change is a diachronic approach and is concerned with the past of the present state of the existing order, but not necessarily a change in the underlying order itself.

(1) Data

My objection to evolution on the level of scientific observation is that there are no data.

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This, I am aware, is an extreme statement. Perhaps I would receive more credulous attention if I were to say, as does T. A. Goudge³ in *The Ascent of Life*, that "The evidence is fragmentary." But in doing so I would only be following a common pattern of uncritical thought. However, in taking the more radical position, I wish to be understood only in terms of the support which I shall develop for it.

First, the fragmentary data that have been used in evolutionary works are the data of a synchronic order and not of a diachronic process. To take the categories of the existing synchronic order of life and make them into a model for the process of change of each one of these categories; and, then, to place the fragmentary fossil remains into these categories does not thereby transform these fossils into diachronic data.

A former paleontologist at California State College in Long Beach told me of an open cliff where layers supposedly contained millions of years of the evolutionary sequence of life. However, he said that there is absolutely no evidence of transition from one layer to the next. This was puzzling to him. His explanation was that each form *must* have entered from somewhere else. In other words, evolution *must* have occurred somewhere else.

Some may say, "How do you know it didn't?" The point is however, "How do you know it did in the absence of data?" The data of evolution must be transitional data otherwise there are only the data of an existent or synchronic order.

This leads to a second observation regarding the absence of data, and that is data are generated by means of the evolutionary model rather than generalized from data. In their imagination, men assume and fill in what the model requires, rather than use the model to explain what is observed. The generation of data occurs in a number of ways. For example, in two sentences White⁴ leaps from assumption to fact:

If we *assume*, as many authorities do, that culture began a million years ago, and if we date the beginning of agriculture at about 10,000 years ago, then the human energy stage of cultural development comprises some ninety-nine percent of culture history thus far. This *fact* is as significant as it is remarkable.

Probability is another technique for generating historical or diachronic data. After observing theoretical positions in the synchronic data of endogamy and exogamy White⁵ steps out on the course of time: "We may now undertake to sketch the *probable* source of development of human society in its earliest stages from the standpoint of endogamy."

Still further, "would be" data are called upon to substitute for the absence of observed data.

Such statements as the following are frequently made in the course of attempts to explain the supposed evolutionary origins of human society:

We might assume, therefore, that the tendency of mother and son to unite sexually *would be* greater than the tendency of the father and daughter. . . . a mother-son union *would be* less effective as an organization for self-defense, food getting, and reproduction than a father-daughter union.⁶

As good as this reasoning is, and as important as reason is, as we shall emphasize later, its use to supply the lack of data is only a testimony to its absence.

Evolutionary physical anthropologists can see how anthropologists of a half century ago used the model to create their data. Brace and Montague point out that Neanderthal man was given many gorilla like characteristics because this served to illustrate a stage of evolution. It is now known that he had shorter arms instead of the long ape like arms and that he was not stooped. Furthermore, the ferocious beast-like evolving temperament that he was supposed to have as a cave man is unlike the gorilla that supplied the link in the evolutionary sequence. Brace and Montague state regarding this fictitious datum:

More than just residues of this libel remain today in casual conversation, in the standard newspaper cartoon portrayal, in numerous popular books on science and even in professional circles where it should have long since disappeared.⁷

Errors of a generation or two ago are readily recognizable; nevertheless, they are repeated in the more sophisticated light of today.

A few select statements, not taken out of context, from Ross clearly outline the "generating power" of the evolutionary model when limited to synchronic data. Emphases have been added:

When one realizes that all chemical matter in the universe . . . started as the simple gas hydrogen, and that life on earth is the most complex known system of extremely complex chemical molecules, *it is obvious that somewhere and sometime in the past there was a transition* from simple chemical organization of the primeval universe to the complex chemical organization that is life. That life did originate we know, because the earth is now populated by living beings. . . . *There seems little doubt* that these elementary ingredients of pre-life somehow came together in cell-like spherules and formed some sort of protein-nucleic acid system. . . . *it is reasonable to assume* that eventually one of these highly advanced spherules changed in such a manner that it did two things: (1)

When it reached a certain chemical composition, it divided into two daughter spherules; and (2) each daughter spherule had the same chemical properties as the "young" parent spherule and repeated the process. *At this point a spherule had almost imperceptibly become an organism.* True life had come into existence.⁸

Here the synchronic data of an existing order plus human imagination yields the missing diachronic data. What are not *observed* as data become *obvious* from the evolutionary model.

A third point supporting the objection that evolution has no data is that there are evolutionary anthropologists who either in a limited or indirect way recognize this fact. Wm. Howells admits the absence of data in any line leading to living man,

Where did *Homo Erectus* go? The paths are simply untraced. . . . This is a period lacking useful evidence. Above all, the nature of the line leading to living man—*Homo Sapiens* in this Linnaean sense—remains a matter of pure theory.⁹

Leslie White's admission that evolution is without empirical data is more indirect and perhaps unintended. This is found in the manner in which he differentiates evolution from a synchronic structural-functional science and from the diachronic phenomena of history. White says that the structural-functional approach of natural scientists is a generalization of the data of a synchronic order. Historians, however, treat the particular events or data of diachronic phenomena and do not generalize. Evolutionists generalize in terms of the temporal or diachronic order. However, they do not generalize from particular cultures nor the particular events of particular cultures.

Evolutionists then are left without the data of the synchronic order of natural science and without the temporal data of history. The result is a philosophy that is not grounded in the empirical world.

A final testimony to the absence of data comes from an effort to overcome this deficiency. Francis J. Ryan, writing in *Scientific American*, claims that "there is plenty of evidence for evolution, but it has been extremely difficult to study the process in the laboratory."¹⁰ "The reason," Ryan says, "is that evolution is exasperatingly slow. Man today differs little biologically from the man of Ur 5,000 years ago. Almost nowhere in nature can we see evolution in action."¹¹

But where then is the evidence or data? Ryan's opening statement gives us the key. "Our ideas about evolution today, nearly 100 years after Charles Darwin launched his immensely fruit-

ful concept, are still based largely on observation and deduction rather than on experiment."¹² In other words, in the absence of processual or diachronic data, the data of a synchronic order from different points in time are arranged by deduction into the diachronic framework of evolution.

Ryan suggests that the process of evolution may be studied in bacteria which take only twenty minutes to produce one generation, whereas it takes twenty years in human beings. Thus in two years bacteria can pass through more generations than man could in 1,000,000 years.

A case is built on the observation that due to random mutations a penicillin resistant bacterium is produced when penicillin has been introduced. This is indeed a case for mutation in inherited characteristics and of natural selection but the end product is not evolution. Bacteria are still bacteria and the generations of hundreds of years have not produced anything else.

(2) Reason and Logic

My second anthropological objection to evolution is that it is inherently irrational. Evolutionists frequently raise the charge of irrational against those who oppose them. By implication Goudge does this when he says, "No reasonable person acquainted with the evidence can doubt that man is a product of evolution."¹³ I have shown that there is no evidence for the diachronic process of evolution and I will now attempt to show that the idea of evolution violates the demands of reason.

First, the core of an irrational characteristic is found in the attempt to apply the principle of uniformitarianism of the synchronic approach of science to the evolutionary explanation of diachronic or temporal phenomena. A clear statement of the principle of uniformitarianism is found in Berry's *Growth of a Prehistoric Time Scale*: ". . . natural processes and functions observable today have been going on in the same basic manner throughout past time."¹⁴ Goudge describes this application without recognizing the irrational problem:

Another example . . . is the "uniformitarian principle" . . . Its function is to make possible the extrapolation backwards in time of results obtained from the investigation of present-day organisms. The principle states, roughly that factors and laws now discovered to be operative in the biological domain were operative throughout all or most of the history of life. An evolutionist has to espouse this principle if he is to employ the findings of sciences such as genetics to construct systematic explanations of the phenomena of the remote past. If he did not espouse it, his

theory would fail to work. But again, the situation has to be understood in more than instrumental terms. For the doctrine of evolution would fail to be intelligible unless the uniformitarian principle describes what is the case. It must be true that biological factors and laws now known to be operative were at work in the past. This is a statement incapable of being proved within evolutionary theory, because it functions as a metaphysical presupposition of that theory.¹⁵

Assumptions and metaphysical presuppositions are not to be discredited as such. They constitute a necessary part of the development of all scientific knowledge. The irrational factor is found when the necessary metaphysical presupposition is found to be incongruous with the theory itself.

The synchronic principle of uniformitarianism involves the concept that events in nature of the past, present, and future take place uniformly. Without this assumption the universe would be capricious and scientists could make no generalizations.

However, when this assumption is used in a diachronic explanation of how things came to be, it becomes inherently inconsistent, for to do so involves the assumption that things in the past took place as things are now observed when the things now observed were not yet existent. Evolutionists assume that at least some of the regularities of the present did not exist in the past, while they use the uniformitarian principle as if all things in the past took place according to the regularities now observed.

To make our reasoning more specific, evolutionists assume that at one time the phenomena of man did not exist; therefore, things in the past were not taking place in terms of this phenomena. On the other hand, phenomena that now exist were operating to bring man into existence, even though such phenomena are not observed to be doing that now.

To go further down the evolutionary scale, evolutionists would assume that the biological regularities now operating were at one time not operating because they were not yet in existence, so again all things in the past were not occurring according to the regularities now observed, except of course the regularities of inorganic nature. However, these were operating but not according to processes now observed as occurring today since they were operating to produce life.

But suppose we push the evolutionary scale to a logical or reasonable conclusion and ask for the origins of the inorganic? At this point *none* of the processes we now observe would be in operation. At this point the assumptions of uniformitarianism which evolutionists have pre-

empted as a metaphysical presupposition, would be totally eliminated by the diachronic assumptions of evolution itself. Evolutionists therefore in order to use the synchronically sound principle of uniformitarianism must make two rationally unsupportable decisions:

(1) What part of the now observable regularities of nature operated in the past to bring all of the other regularities into existence. Even here these regularities are asked to do what they are not now doing and hence are a violation of the principle of uniformitarianism.

(2) How far the uniformitarian assumption will be pushed before it is totally denied.

The incongruence of the principle of uniformitarianism with evolution focuses our attention on the transition involved between the three major categories of (a) matter, (b) life, and (c) culture. Kroeber and many anthropologists since have referred to these categories as the inorganic, the organic, and the superorganic. We have shown that transitional data within the subdivisions of these categories are absent.

Supposed transition from one category to another has called forth a tremendous exercise of the imagination. As stated earlier, imaginative and speculative thought is not to be discredited merely because it is speculation. It is the irrational character of this speculation that forms a basis for objection.

(a) Matter

The problem of the origin of the first category of matter has produced a wide range of responses that cannot meet the criteria of rationality. I shall list three merely to illustrate:

(1) The big bang theory in which a big concentrated molecule of pre-universe matter explodes to produce the present ordered universe of matter.

(2) The universe of matter is a product of a primordial dust cloud which was presumably matter.

(3) The position that is most rational of the three in which the theorist rationally gives up on this problem as beyond the reasoning powers of man.

Yet, all of these as well as the steady state and the cyclical theories fundamentally give to us an eternally existent matter and therefore deny the origins which they attempt to explain. In them the god of materialism is obviously inherent.

But how can one rationally account for the beginning of life or man at any point in time from an eternally existent matter? How could it eternally exist without producing life and then at some point in time do what it had not for an eternity? Perhaps an eternity of cycles in which

universes and man have come and gone is the only consistent answer.

(b) Life

The problem of evolving from matter to life may not be quite so frustrating to speculative thought, but it is not without an irrational character. In a recently televised National Geographic documentary the viewers were told without any implication of doubt that at some time in the dim distant past two giant molecules came together and became reproducing. Life, which is dependent upon a genetic code for its reproduction, and which alone produces the genetic code, is presented as coming into existence by a fortuitous congruence of the material constituents of life. I am not a biologist, but the arguments presented against this by Dr. Duane Gish have been rationally convincing to me.¹⁶

However, I would like to illustrate the irrationality of evolution at this point by referring to another biologist, George Wald. In the August, 1954 issue of the *Scientific American*, Wald presents his reasoning in an article entitled, "The Origin of Life." Here Wald presents the modern scientific evidence as established by Pasteur and others against the spontaneous generation of life.

He then shows how the complexity of the phenomena of life places it beyond the imagination to think that it could have arisen from the non-living by chance. Upon which he then announces, "Yet here we are—as a result, I believe, of spontaneous generation."¹⁷ His reason for his faith is that he refuses to accept the only alternative. Wald gives his rationale:

The reasonable view was to believe in spontaneous generation; the only alternative, to believe in a single, primary act of supernatural creation. There is no third position. For this reason many scientists a century ago chose to regard the belief in spontaneous generation as a philosophical necessity. . . . Most modern biologists, having viewed with satisfaction the downfall of the spontaneous generation hypothesis, yet unwilling to accept the alternative belief in special creation, are left with nothing.¹⁸

At least the rationality of this choice of faith is not demonstrated. However, its irrational character is found in its defense.

Wald begins by *assuming* "with every event one can associate a probability."¹⁹ He uses as his model of events the flipping of a coin. This is however an observable, repeatable event. The spontaneous generation of life is not however of this nature; in fact, it has not even been established by Wald at this point in his argument as being an event.

Yet, he goes on to reason that no matter how small the chances of an event occurring, it is increased by the number of trials or time involved. If the chances are only one in a billion for an event occurring in one year, it would be almost a certainty for it to occur in a billion years. However, Wald does all of this without establishing the chance of spontaneous generation occurring in one year or a billion years. The clue to the irrational position is that there is *no* establishable probability for this event in any length of time. And zero multiplied by any number of years is still zero.

(c) Culture

Finally, the attempt to speculate on the transition from precultural life to culture or from lower animal to man is fraught with the same irrational character. White says of the origin of culture,

We may assume that culture came into being in the following way: Neurological evolution in a certain line, or lines, of anthropoids culminated eventually in the ability to symbol. The exercise of this ability brought culture into existence and then perpetuated it.²⁰

Yet, man today with these faculties is dependent upon association with others having language and culture not only to survive, but to learn a language and the associated culture. White would tell us that man possessing the symboling faculty without culture created culture, and then he holds that it is culture that determines man and that man cannot even modify culture much less create it.

It is this kind of irrational "bind" that speculative thinkers are caught in whenever they attempt to use the synchronic principle of uniformitarianism for an evolutionary effort to link the three major categories of matter, life, and culture.

(3) Theory

My third anthropological objection to evolution is that it is not scientific theory. This partially rests upon the first two objections registered. If there are no data to explain, evolution can hardly be a scientific theory. If evolution is used to generate data rather than explain, it can hardly be given the status of science. Because data are generated rather than explained by means of evolution, then evolution is not subject to falsification or scientific test.

Darwin's ideas were not a verification of a scientific hypothesis. Nor has evolution ever been tested since it is not like scientific theories that are supported, modified, or discarded in the ongoing process of scientific investigation. That

evolution should be subject to questioning is regarded more as an heresy than as a heuristic procedure of science.

Finally, I wish to support the position that evolution is not a scientific theory because it is instead a structure of values. First, evolution is a structure of values because it is a time perspective. The way men in all cultures order their lives is in accordance with the way they look into the past, and into the future, and focus these on the alternatives of the present. By evolution men supposedly gain a past that goes beyond their practical imagination to the nonrational amoral realm of the lower animals. Evolutionists have little but uncertainty to offer for the future of the race; and, to the individual, nothing beyond death. It is more than a correlation that the moral orders of modern societies are crumbling as the time perspective of evolution is put, more and more, into the position of unquestionable dominance in the minds of men.

Secondly, evolution is a value because adherents locate the absolute in material nature. The materialistic deity of evolution, though unknown, is pointed to in a statement by George G. Simpson:

The ultimate mystery is beyond the reach of scientific investigation, and probably of the human mind. There is neither need nor excuse for postulation of nonmaterial intervention in the origin of life, the rise of man, or any other part of the long history of the material cosmos. Yet, the origin of that cosmos and the causal principles of its history remain unexplained and inaccessible to science. Here is hidden the first cause sought by theology and philosophy. The first cause is not known and I suspect it never will be known to living man. We may, if we are so inclined, worship it in our own ways, but we certainly do not comprehend it.²¹

This undiscoverable absolute, hidden in the existence of matter, beyond the reach of science, is the position of a deity and hence of absolute values.

Finally, evolution is a value system because proponents make value claims upon man. Simpson realizes that evolution leaves man with a need for an ethic, and yet the survival of the fittest mechanism of evolution is hardly a suitable basis for human ethics. He finally arrives at the conclusion that since the amoral process of evolution produced the moral and rational creature called man, man is obligated to obtain this knowledge and to make it known to others. The object of this moral obligation is necessarily limited to fellow human beings since it is difficult to see the basis of a moral obligation to an amoral process.

However this may be, what we have is not a scientific theory, but an aspect of social relationships attempting to give some sense of moral direction to man. Direction is desperately needed. But it is not convincingly clear how the knowledge that my existence as a moral being is a product of an amoral process called evolution, can give to me a sense of moral direction. Neither is it clear how witnessing to that process constitutes moral direction. This last statement is not however presented as an anthropological objection. It might, however, be listed as an objection of applied anthropology because its cultural ineffectiveness is obvious.

Summation

In summary, as an anthropologist, I object to evolution on the anthropological grounds that I have presented. There are no data for evolution. Proponents use the idea of evolution to create or generate data by appropriating the synchronic data of science in an effort to use that very synchronic order to explain how it came into existence. The process of using synchronic categories of nature as a model of the diachronic development of that order is an inherently irrational process.

All of the categories of matter, life, and culture indeed have a past and their history as far as discoverable takes us into that past. However, neither data nor reason justify the arrangement of fossil apes and fossil men in a sequence of development from ape to man.

And finally, the attempt to get at origins through nonobserved temporal processes produces only a value structure, not scientific theory. As such, ultimate origins are never reached. Instead, adherents attempt to find an absolute hidden in an amoral eternal material existence.

Deification of matter is not to be confused with the metaphysical foundations of the scientific investigation of matter. The scientific study of the existing order of creation must necessarily be kept distinct from any consideration of how that order came to be. In attempting to ignore this necessary distinction, evolutionists follow an irrational approach to data that are products of their own speculation resulting in a value structure rather than scientific theory.

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THE CAUSE OF THE ICE AGE*

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It is shown that there has been only one ice age and that the theories of multiple ice ages are misinterpretations based for the most part on index fossils. Carbon-14 dating and the recession of Niagara Falls are used to demonstrate that the ice age is an extremely recent event. Evidence is presented to show that the ice age was caused by, and that it followed the universal flood. Evaporation of floodwaters cooled the atmosphere below the freezing point. It is proposed that melting of an Arctic icecap that floated northward in the floodwaters lowered the temperature of the ocean from 25° C. almost to zero. Just as evaporation is a cooling process, so is freezing a "heating" process which automatically brought on the postdiluvian "Climatic Optimum" which raised world temperatures 5° above "normal" after the ice age.

Introduction

Many conflicting theories have been proposed to explain the origin of the ice age. There is no need, however, for the pessimism expressed by Robin.¹ It is my conviction that an Ice Age would be expected to follow a universal flood. The areas now deserts were "soaking wet" for centuries following the flood. There were lakes everywhere; in fact, as shown by Lammerts,² vast lakes existed in the San Joaquin valley as late as 1870.

Evaporation kept the humidity at 100% most of the time. The earth was thus a new-style refrigerator—a modern evaporator type. For evaporation is a cooling process and if there is enough evaporation, and it is rapid enough, then it is a *freezing process*. Every cubic centimeter of evaporating water cools the atmosphere by 540 calories. Water vapor was rising from what now are deserts, from thousands of lakes, and from greatly enlarged oceans.

Thus, it could be said, from this point of view, that the earth was an ultra-modern dual-style

refrigerator with two kinds of refrigeration operating simultaneously. Freezing cold evaporation clouds were rising everywhere, resulting in rain-fall in the tropical areas and snowfall in the temperate zones, and cold winds were flowing across the resulting snow and ice fields pouring continuous snowfall on the adjoining shore lands.

Thus moisture laden supersaturated clouds were carried by wind currents to northern Canada, Scotland, Norway, and Sweden where snow fell daily from November to April, accumulating to depths of 500 to 1,000 feet during the first winter. One hundred years of such snowfall results in about 50,000 feet of ice—the glacial age. The tops of these ice mountains, a mile high, would be so cold that snow would continue to pile up all spring and early fall as well as in the winter. Very little would melt in the cold July and August summer. The result would be cumulative, the higher the mountain, the colder the temperature and the greater the snowfall or ice particle fall. The weight of such ice would cause it to flow outward across the Baltic Sea, depositing boulders all across the north German plains, as we find them today.

Such in general is my concept of how the glacial age was the inevitable result of a world wide flood. Now let us see how well the facts, as we know them, about the surface of the earth,

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