Getting Worldview Wrong: Philosophical Mistakes in Understanding Worldview

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Abstract

Using a novel definition for "knowledge," this article lists several philosophical mistakes resulting from underestimating, overestimating, or misunderstanding the nature and/or limits of worldview. These mistakes serve as tutorials for understanding worldview as a truth-predictive component of man's finite epistemological framework, approximating and/or simulating perfect knowledge of reality for purposes of decision making.

Introduction

Many works related to "worldview" have been written over the last 250 years; however, seemingly obvious philosophical mistakes were being made, primarily because the term lacked clear, systematic definition. Consequently, Chisham (2012, 2014, 2015) set out to assemble a working set of mechanics to explain worldview's existence and functionality. What emerged was a decision-based epistemology (whereas contemporary and traditional epistemologies focus on perception). Chisham (2018) then surveyed traditional and contemporary approaches to worldview, observing that worldview may be evaluated from the perspective of time, by discussing categories it affects, or observing effects from natural (e.g., mortality and lan-guage) or conventional (e.g., religion and nationality) boundaries.

Having understood these things, it now seems instructive to discuss some common philosophical errors to demonstrate why correctly understanding worldview's structure and nature is critical. In order to do so, however, first "knowledge" appears to be another key term requiring clarification, for it provides the fundamental components worldview uses.

The Nature and Definition of Knowledge

One reason this decision-driven worldview epistemology will look different from virtually every philosophic tradition lies in its understanding of "knowl-edge." Platonist Alvin Plantinga (1993, p. v) traces the history of this age-old question:

> In *Theaetetus*, Plato sets the agenda for Western epistemology: What is knowledge? More exactly, what is it that distinguishes knowledge from mere true belief? What is this elusive quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for knowledge?

Cartesian Lawrence Bonjour (2010, p. 30) posits an answer to Plato's question:

> A useful way in which this point is sometimes put is to say … knowledge is a "success" concept.… The aim of the cognitive enterprise is truth: we want our beliefs to correctly describe the world.… according to the traditional account of knowledge, we attempt to accomplish this by seeking beliefs for which we have good reasons or strong justification. When this endeavor is successful … we have knowledge; when it fails, when … strongly justified beliefs are

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not in fact true, we have only what might be described as "attempted knowledge."

Anthony Liska (2016, p. 34), a Thomist, comments:

> The principle statement of [Aquinas's] theory [on mind and knowledge] asserts that knowledge is the 'having of a form of another without its matter.'

The unexamined Thomistic presumption is this "having" is binary. You either possess all its essence or none; there is no middle ground. Chisholm (1982, p. 177) complains:

> Aristotle taught that, in knowing, the soul "receives the form of the object" and that "actual knowledge is identical with its object." … This doctrine, which was developed by Thomas Aquinas and his commentators … could be taken to say that, when [a] man perceives a dog, then the *man*, or his soul, takes on *all* the characteristics of the dog, though without becoming "identical with the matter" of the dog, and that when the man perceives a dog and a bird together, then the *man* becomes "formally identical" with the *dog*, and *also* with the *bird*. There have been many attempts to make this doctrine intelligible, but I cannot feel that they have been successful.

Initially, I used the term "data" rather than "knowledge" (Chisham, 2012) because it better described informational macro-trends and avoided pitfalls and philosophical trappings in the term "knowledge." That also turned out an unfortunate word choice because "sense data" can imply a Humean concept called "bundle theory." "Sense data" and "virtual data" as I use them are virtually identical to Aquinas's "sense knowledge" and "intellectual knowledge" (Liska, 2016, p. 66), except Chisham (2015) also demonstrated virtual data is often convolutionally generated by "rethinking" previously acquired sense and virtual data to create further conclusions.

That said, what *can* be said about knowledge? First, like fingerprints, each person's total knowledge is both unique and dynamic, as people learn and sometimes forget. Certainly, individuals can share aspects of knowledge because that is the basis for communication. Moreover, people pursue and acquire knowledge like property, sometimes paying great sums of money for tutorial assistance. Thus, the owner of knowledge must be the person holding it. Moreover, if knowledge is uniquely owned, logically it must reflect its owner's nature, which for humans means being both *finite* and *fallible*. Truth, on the other hand, per correspondence theory, is that which (immutably) conforms to reality (otherwise it would not necessarily be true) and thus is unconstrained by human limitations. As such, one might say truth is "owned" by reality (or is the property of being actual).

While human knowledge must have the latitude to be limited and wrong (without losing its status as "knowledge"), we still depend on its accuracy, for one cannot successfully pursue his objectives (Aristotle's "good") with bad information. Faulty knowledge typically causes worldview simulation failure, predicting the wrong outcome and suggesting inappropriate responses. So, while individuals intend their knowledge to represent truth (philosophically speaking, "knowledge intends truth"), the degree to which it does represents its measure of excellence.

Pragmatically, knowledge only need be functionally right, not perfect. Moreover, knowledge comes in types, some requiring greater certainty than others (e.g., brain surgery vs. philosophy). Per Thomism, direct perception (e.g., a car stopping in front of you) generally requires no "justification" whatsoever. Again, the purpose for retaining knowledge is to make right decisions, not to be academically right. To use a bookkeeping term, knowledge only need be "materially correct," sufficient for the decision at hand.

> Worldview is our real-time, interactive working model for understanding current situational context and predicting proper responses [which]…would be undetectable if it matched reality perfectly. The so-called "coloring" happens…because our finite working model has flaws and limitations. Set side-by-side with reality, imperfections in projections show up most profoundly at the edges and margins where consequences of our inaccuracies and estimations become most apparent. "Better design" would not change or "fix" this…. It is simply the nature of being finite.

Thus, it seems more reasonable to define knowledge generally as simply (sense or virtual) information an individual has judged sufficiently true—whether it is or not—to base a decision on it. If we accept this, human knowledge may describe truth with some efficiency approaching 100%—or may have a negative value. Hence, important decisions may require reflective validation (e.g., Descartes' doubt) to reprocess supportive knowledge and recalculate truth projections. Contrary to Descartes, however, no one questions everything, for that would cause mental immobilization.

Asserting any knowledge-must-equal-truth definition would mean humans make decisions constantly based on something other than knowledge—and what should that be called? Should another word be invented? A pilot takes off believing weather conditions are favorable, which may cost his and others' lives (e.g., wind shear). And what do people say? They say he did not "know" any better. People categorically never make decisions based on actual truth, they decide based on information they possess or *know* (synonymous with *believe*). Some philosophers would assert the phrase "to the best of my knowledge" is not technically accurate. Quite the contrary, if philosophy has so defined "knowledge" that it fails to conform to the human feature it is intended to describe, it is the philosophy that errs! Hence, the Bible speaks of "knowledge of the truth," clearly implying knowledge may consist of something else. Its typical meaning is "knowledge of the truth," but exceptions are common.

Epistemologically, failing to distinguish between knowledge and truth makes philosophical nonsense of one or both because each takes on its respective owners' nature. Just as a clutch mediates energy between the engine and the road, averting various mechanical failures, knowledge catches the slip between reality and our imperfect worldview. Saying otherwise confuses reality with our finite construct of it, resulting in a host of philosophical "adjustments" (revealing a fundamentally mistaken view).

In so-called "Gettier" examples, a person makes a correct judgement based on at least partially incorrect information. Plantinga (1993, p. 33) provides an example:

> Consider a person who at noon happens to look at the clock that stopped at midnight last night, thus acquiring the belief that it is noon; this belief is true and (we may stipulate) justified, but clearly not knowledge. But why not, precisely? What is going on in these cases? One salient point: in each of these cases it is merely *by accident* that the justified true belief in question is true.

So, for Plantinga "knowledge" has to be "justified," "true," a "belief," and … something mysterious he cannot quite pinpoint. This is because conventional, binary, all-or-nothing definitions of "knowledge" force Plantinga to search for a "one size fits all" scenario, where knowledge necessarily equals truth, confusing his worldview with reality itself. Rejecting rigid "knowledge = truth" equations solves Gettier's (false) dilemma, where definitions of knowledge fail when they cannot potentially accommodate mistakes. If we do not force men to know as God does, human knowledge can be valid, false, or potentially both! Otherwise, we must say men like Newton "knew" nothing because their understanding was brilliant but imperfect.

Note this view of knowledge does not disparage Thomistic forms. Rationality uses the senses to construct a "digitized reduction" (philosophically, an "intention") to classify a thing's nature, sufficiently detailed for the decision or judgment at hand. Normally, language is required for rational reflection (which creates virtual data) and communication. In some cases, technical expertise (specialized virtual data) is required.

On the other hand, Aristotle's view of objects as aggressors acting on the senses seems incomplete. It seems obvious objects do not seek to impress their images on an individual's mind; rather, the individual's agent intellect (*intellectus agens*) uses every available direct or indirect sense mechanism to identify and classify objects (not absorb their form) so the individual can successfully navigate his environment. If he were asleep, anesthetized, or dead, the object would be impotent to impress his senses. The agent intellect is the active party attempting to *extract* information from its environment and only passively the rock being sensed. Contrary to Descartes or Hume, however, a properly functioning agent intellect will not invent fictional reality because its function is to learn what is there, not what is not.

So, the intellect's goal in sensation is to sufficiently sample reality so an animal can successfully navigate his world via Aristotle's estimative power (*vis aestimativa*). In humans, a layer riding on top of sense knowledge via Aristotle's cogitative power (*vis cogitativa*) allows us to define sense information linguistically (porting it into the virtual realm). Thus, language facilitates information manipulation by logic, as well as social information sharing, which results in the formation of one's worldview. In short, depriving a human of language would reduce him to animal instincts and prevent formation of his worldview. Moreover, omniscience is not required, only sufficient apprehension, which varies depending on the purpose for perceiving. This is not a nominalist abandonment of universals; if a category were not real (e.g., mankind, dog kind, etc.) there could be no transcendent quality capable of recognition (classification), linguistic definition, transmission, or translation. Linguistic translation serves as prima facie evidence that universals do exist, even if we know them imperfectly.

In applying these principles pragmatically, recall a recent argument. Now imagine the argument without words for expression or even contemplation! Finite rationality cannot function without language to provide surrogate tokens for virtualizing meaning. Given vocabulary is so critical to rationality, while some view it as quaint folklore, God's first assignment to Adam makes perfect sense. Adam would have started the day with minimal or no vocabulary, so naming the animals (Genesis 2:19–20) and dialoging about his choices (as with their evening walks [Genesis 3:8]) systematically populated his vocabulary, teaching Adam to exercise his rationality using language and logic, thus building Adam's socialization skills. God did not need to know the lion's name; He defined its DNA! Adam, however, did need a mental icon to rationalize about the lion's characteristics (cf. 1 Peter 5:8). Rational skills develop in children this same way—by interacting with them in wordplay. Adam then cemented what he had learned by interacting with his mate in this high-speed language emersion lab.

Furthermore, understanding this need to virtualize information, the whole "evolution of language" motif becomes a wishful tautology because if one can virtualize a concept at all, he is capable of communicating it using any physical sense (e.g., audibly, visually [using graphics or sign], combining audible sounds with graphics [phonetics], or touch [e.g., braille]). Indeed, the rate at which new computer languages are developed should be an obvious clue that language is simply a systematic construct of agreed conventions referring to actual things or relationships (a posteriori information), or interpretive constructs and idea inventions (a priori information). In contrast, the *ability* to virtualize is nothing less than a gift by design. So, while it is conceded language involves sequential development of rational tools for dedicated purposes, the capacity to

rationalize appears binary and not the result of a random evolutionary series that simply happened to congeal.

Philosophical Errors Caused by Misunderstanding the Nature and/or Limitations of Worldview

1. *Previous philosophical examples.* Space does not permit repetition of previous examples; therefore, the reader is referred to the following not given in this paper:

A. *Confusing worldview with philosophy and/or personal opinion.* Worldview, as an epistemological function, comprehensively models and predicts reality in order to emulate objectivity in decision making (Chisham, 2015). Philosophy, in contrast, is one intellectual tool used to inform worldview perspectives. Naugle confused the two, conflating worldview as a ubiquitous feature (*worldview structure*) with the meaning people gave it (*worldview perspectives*) (Chisham, 2014, p. 143). Confusing these is probably the single most common mistake among worldview commentators.

B. *Incorporating one's worldview into worldview's definition.* Similar to Naugle above, Colson and Pearcey inadvertently incorporated their personal Christian beliefs into the general definition of "worldview" (Chisham, 2014, p. 144; 2018, p. 182).

C. *Thinking my ideas redefine reality.* Solipsism gets it exactly backward, believing worldview defines reality instead of vice versa (Chisham, 2015, p. 12).

2. *Confusing factual (empirical) knowledge with worldview's manufactured virtual knowledge.* Many worldview errors fall under this heading, complicated by the fact that, depending on the ratio of truth to interpolation, parsing the difference often comes in shades of gray.

"My reality is not your reality" may be true in a restrictive, experiential sense, but actual reality is universal because *reality is not owned by persons*. It would be accurate to agree that individual perceptions differ but nothing more. Suggesting otherwise requires denial of the law of noncontradiction, which sacrifices rationality itself.

"I believe in science, but you believe in religion" or speaking of "the fact of evolution" are also examples of this categorical confusion. Menton (2013) reports of Eugenie Scott encouraging just such worldview snobbery in addressing the 2006 American Association for the Advancement of Science in St. Louis. Scott queried the audience, "Do you believe in evolution?" and then insisted the question should always be phrased, "Do you accept evolution?" Menton rightly concluded:

> So is evolution a belief system? Evolution is necessarily a belief because molecules-to-man evolution is not observable but rather must be inferred and believed. This is why evolutionists are stumped when asked to give an observable example of one kind of creature evolving into a different kind of creature. If pressed, they inevitably give an example of limited variation within a kind that is not a contested issue between evolutionists and creationists.… is evolution a worldview? Any belief system that purports to explain the origin of virtually everything that is real is a religion or worldview.

Beliefs can be inferred, theorized, or philosophized, but empirical, scientific proof is a different level of human knowledge. As Ken Ham is fond of asking, "Were you there?" This is not to say dialog on origins has no merit but only that humans should have the intellectual honesty to accurately represent their arguments.

3. *The skepticism trap: because one cannot know all truth, truth cannot be known.* While most philosophical approaches

acknowledge epistemological finitude, some advance this non sequitur, suggesting all knowledge is self-referential. This is the postmodern error. Postmodern historian Frank Ankersmit (Ankersmit, 1997, pp. 294–295) states:

> In the postmodernist view, the focus is no longer on the past itself, but on the incongruity between present and past, between the language we presently use for speaking about the past and the past itself.

Moreover, Jenkins (1997, p. 6) dismisses history in its entirety in saying,

> In fact history now appears to be just one more foundationless, positioned expression in a world of foundationless, positioned expressions.

They are not simply recommending readers account for a writer's perspective; they are suggesting modern readers cannot possibly even know what historical authors intended, due to the inaccuracies of linguistic communications. "Foundationless" presumes words have no objective meaning and logic is a mutable human convention.

Reading is a virtual, rational experience fully contained within one's mind. It is not the author's experience (his was writing), so it is strictly the reader's. For example, if a British person reads an American author, he hears dialog with a British accent (and is generally unaware of it), unless he overtly chooses to give the speaker some other accent, which he could do at will. So, on that level one might agree with Jenkins and Ankersmit.

However, competent readers do not see the words on the page; they see through the words, sharing the writer's experience. This makes it clear language refers to things outside both minds. Though a writer's skill and his readers' perceptions be imperfect and non-identical, usually the message does convey by virtue of shared human experiences (spanning culture and time). Moreover, the fact one can learn through literature confirms language *can* be grounded in the real world, not just the mind.

Jenkins and Ankersmit, therefore, dare not apply their self-defeating standards to their own works lest they be exposed as meaningless. Furthermore, occasional translation errors fail to demonstrate their view should indiscriminately blanket known historical content, which throws the baby out with the bathwater. Worldviews must ultimately refer to reality, however imperfectly, otherwise we could neither acquire nor translate language, historical study would be meaningless, and legal systems would be reduced to ashes due to presumed limitations of time on meaning. To the contrary, we obviously are able to know but only *according to our nature*—finitely. This will bother any philosophy bent on a binary, all-or-nothing concept of knowledge. Furthermore, the fact that observers often learn additively by validating against existing knowledge—analogy-to-self (Chisham, 2012, p. 66; 2015, pp. 11, 16)—does not argue that what we have learned (i.e., worldview expansion) came from within ourselves. This confuses method with meaning.

Tensions surrounding human finitude are analogous to camera pixilation. Simply because digital cameras have limited resolution does not argue they are thereby legally inadmissible. Likewise, simply because humans know and communicate finitely does not imply the past and/or present are unknowable; we simply recognize real limitations to the evidence we have. Ultimately postmodern skepticism cannot be successful without collapsing human communication and, thus, is just another version of Humean skepticism. If valid, its skeptical "universal acid" would melt legal systems into non-connected, non-correlatable puddles of facts and human statements.

4. *Forgetting we are finite.* Opposite the spectrum from the previous skeptical error, this one overestimates certainty, resulting in positional blindness and relational dysfunction relative to one's skeptics. Some might accuse Christians

of this in claiming to "know" of coming judgment, but this is clearly a faith statement, though its foundations are in historical fact. Moreover, passages like John 20:31 and 1 John 5:13 offering evidence "that you may know" were intended in the normal historiographical sense as competent legal evidence, which must be examined and scrutinized. Greg Bahnsen overstepped this line, however, in a well-known academic debate with R. C. Sproul regarding apologetic methods:

> I maintain it is wrong to think that certainty in epistemological matters is limited to formal logic and mathematics. Certainty, full certainty, full confidence without doubt, without yielding, without qualification, pertains to the matters of the Christian faith. (Bahnsen and Spoul, 1977)

Dr. Bahnsen was correct regarding "matters of … faith"; however, the faith certainty Hebrews 11:1 describes applies to every faith, including atheism (because it is an accurate definition *per se*). Where Bahnsen was incorrect was in asserting epistemological certainty. Sproul complains,

> This whole question of certainty is one that I keep getting all the time. One of the cheap criticisms we [classical apologists] get is that all we leave people with are probabilities.… The only way [any and all humans] can have absolute philosophical certainty about anything is in the pure formal realm.

[This is because mental constructs are human inventions (i.e., *a priori*) and only by creating them are we able to have perfect knowledge of them.]

> Now, unfortunately that doesn't get us into the real world. And as soon as we [humans] get into induction, we [humans] get into the level of uncertainty. Ok? … The problem we're dealing with here is the problem of creatureliness. The only way I can think of to have absolute certainty about anything is to have omniscience. And that we don't have.

That belongs only to God. (Bahnsen and Sproul, 1977)

Sproul added later:

[God has] given us finite capacity for learning. I'm not a skeptic with respect to meaningful knowledge and meaningful discourse. I am a skeptic with respect to the technical concept of absolute philosophical certainty. But I'm not a [skeptic of] common sense … I think that God has given us creaturely ability to learn things. (Bahnsen and Sproul, 1977)

Overconfidence in human certainty forms a common thread between most of the mistakes mentioned here. The skeptic confidently proclaiming superiority because "you believe in religion, but I believe in science" commits the same error as Bahnsen, essentially claiming, "If you would simply adopt my worldview, you would come to my conclusion," which of course is right but proves nothing. It involves the epistemological overstep of not appreciating that finitude dictates that human knowledge is necessarily incomplete to some degree. Objectivity is not generated by cloning worldview constructs but comes out of actual shared reality.

Demanding epistemological certainty in matters of faith requires knowledge beyond the natural human senses, which is a prelude to epistemological failure, demanding more of rationality than it can deliver. Admitting something is a belief does not dismiss or diminish it but acknowledges the limits of objective, empirical (or scientific) certainty. Moreover, for evangelistic atheists and religious zealots alike, the truth of any faith position is only as valid as its object. Hence Paul (1 Corinthians 15:12–19) warned that, as Christians, we are wasting our time unless our claims are based in truth.

The point of balance is that each individual should be free to hold beliefs with conviction, while perspectival discourse proceeds openly and unimpeded. Failing to recognize one's natural limits

to "prove" elevates his ability to know to super-human status, thereby disrespecting another's right to freedom of thought. For a Christian or Jew, this denies a natural, created right. For everyone inclusive, it is simply intellectual dishonesty.

5. *Cartesian Skepticism. The Matrix* portrays a futuristic revisitation to an epistemological thought experiment (e.g., Brain-in-Vat [BIV]), skeptically asking how to be certain sensations are not an illusion, and ultimately questioning our certainty regarding reality. Shocked, the main character discovers his entire world was a computer-simulated forgery. Likewise, Descartes' famous "way of doubt" proposed,

In order to seek truth, it is necessary once in the course of our life, to doubt, as far as possible, of all things. (Descartes, 1901)

His skeptical search for truth reasoned that if he were nonexistent no one would bother to fool him, concluding: "I think, therefore I am." Confident he validated his most basic truth with mathematical certainty, he proposed that knowledge must begin within the mind to rationally demonstrate what is true in the world. This perceptual skepticism permeates most contemporary philosophy.

Unfortunately, Descartes' crucial miscalculation was forgetting his own ability to rationalize was predicated on language that he innocently received in childhood through life experience. His compulsory skepticism of reality was ultimately self-defeating, for simply articulating his question would be impossible without language and concepts gifted to him from reality. Thus, the Cartesian epistemology is simply wrong: you cannot doubt *anything* unless you first consider whether it might exist. Etienne Gilson (2012, location 2036) complains:

There is an Aristotelianism, in addition to [immediate experience] which regulates all judgments, a first source of knowledge, and that is sensation. That is the true mean-

ing of the formula which is so often cited but … rarely accepted in its full vigor … that nothing is in the understanding unless it has first been in the senses. "Nothing" applies to everything, even the content of the first principles of simple apprehensions and of judgements: being and the principle of contradiction.

In reality, Descartes' "way of doubt" was merely a standard error-checking method but not the only, best, or even most common one. The Thomistic epistemology he rejected was more correct, for from childhood we naturally learn most things from a position of trust, not doubt, via interaction with reality. With time we learn to double-check presuppositions but, hopefully, in healthy ways. Even adults naturally trust the vast majority of acquired information because we implicitly trust our senses and rationality. Furthermore, a lifetime is not long enough to negatively recheck every piece of information. Knowledge validation is the exception, not the rule. On the other hand, worldview projections estimating reality for larger decisions do require reflection to certify key truths (cf. Premises VII, VIII, and IX in Chisham, 2012, pp. 68–71).

Though a devout Christian, Descartes' "way (or method) of doubt" became pivotal in modern and postmodern skepticism due to its broad adoption by Hume, Kant, and others. It mistakenly used one's worldview (a rational simulation) to validate reality, rather than acknowledging rationality's primary need to use reality to both inform and validate one's worldview.

Conclusion

"What does being finite mean?" becomes *the* critical question in understanding worldview. All agree others are finite, however, applying finitude to personal epistemologies may risk crises, exposing treasured personal certainties to potential loss. Opposite the spectrum from

certitude, however, simple observation demonstrates Hume's skepticism of induction as unwarranted and simply wrongheaded. In fact, worldview's interpolative intuition is precisely what his skepticism missed. So, where exactly is the middle ground between perfect knowledge and Cartesian skepticism? It must lie in this idea that humans never hold a perfect grasp of reality but manufacture a finite working copy we call perception. Though "only" a copy, its representations must factually exist, otherwise we would have nothing! Moreover, humans rely on its accuracy—imperfections and all (hence Gettier's false dilemma). Knowledge cannot be truth but functions as its finite surrogate. Consequently, requiring knowledge to directly equate to truth before acknowledging its existence seems an arbitrary, tragic philosophical mistake, unnecessarily requiring perfect coherence between a human feature and the reality it describes. Hence, this new decision-based approach hopes to have retraced epistemology without bowing prematurely to any particular philosophical tradition, saying only what observation has warranted.

Worldview is not subjective opinion but a factual, necessary component of finite human rationality, though its breadth makes it difficult to visualize and evaluate. Only its conclusions are subjective. Standard epistemologies focus on perception, viewing life like a collection of photographic "stills"—a backyard tree or squirrel outside the window. However, singularies do not create context. Instead, this decision-based epistemology asks how worldview information aggregates, forming more than a "picture of reality" or "glasses" coloring and distorting perception. Rather, worldview is our real-time, interactive working model for understanding current situational context and predicting proper responses, characterized by the presence of language. Worldview is not

separate from knowledge but generates our perspective of reality based on the sum of our knowledge, which would be undetectable if it matched reality perfectly. The so-called "coloring" happens, not because something distorts otherwise perfect vision but because our finite working model has flaws and limitations. Set side-by-side with reality, imperfections in projections show up most profoundly at the edges and margins where consequences of our inaccuracies and estimations become most apparent. "Better design" would not change or "fix" this, considering the research dollars and man-centuries spent trying to re-create "artificial intelligence." It is simply the nature of being finite.

Having described the nature and structure of worldview (Chisham, 2012, 2014, 2015) and compared that understanding to other approaches (Chisham, 2018), this article has suggested ways to constrain those who might overextend their ability to know and demonstrated the paradox of human knowledge—knowing truth, yet not perfectly. Some might object this description of worldview's nature reduces man to a robot, consisting of algorithms and data. "Robot," however, is merely allegorical language conveying man's finitude. The imaginative children's classic Pinocchio tells of a wooden marionette becoming a real boy, which Christianity would argue analogically mirrors finite, fallen man gaining eternal fellowship with his perfect Creator. But had Carlo Collodi, Pinocchio's creator, been a twenty-first century contemporary, surely he would have envisioned a robot instead!

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