THE SCIENTIFIC CHARACTER OF THE EVOLUTION DOCTRINE

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It is becoming increasingly apparent that evolutionism is not even a good scientific theory. For example, evolutionists assert that life arose naturally from non-living matter and yet no evidence exists favoring "spontaneous generation." The creationist explanation at this point is simpler and also more adequate.

Evolutionism is shown to be neither a theory nor an hypothesis but a dogma or doctrine. It does not legitimately fall under the heading of "natural science" but fits within the domain of philosophy because it is a materialistic postulate.

On six accounts evolution theory is shown to fall short of what should be required in any truly "scientific" postulate or conception. Finally, although neither creationism nor evolutionism is strictly a "scientific" concept, creationism should be favored because it is more consistent with our knowledge and is at the same time rooted in the word of God.

Origins and Scientific Facts

In the former century when the views of Darwin conquered the scientific world, they unquestionably had some merit by giving rise to an extensive inquiry into the variability of living organisms, and into concrete evidence for variation.

It is to be regretted, however, that many biologists became so enthusiastic for the theory that they went much further than the concrete body of facts. They connected these facts with a materialistic philosophy, ranging far beyond the purely scientific horizon. In this way the evolutionistic views grew to become an all-encompassing doctrine.

But we would be greatly in error to call such a doctrine a scientific theory. Any "scientific" theory ought to be based on scientific facts, not on speculation. It is hardly believable that for instance Grassé[1] can write: "Les biologistes . . . sont profondément convaincus que l'évolution est un *fait* indiscutable" (The biologists are profoundly convinced that evolution is an indisputable *fact).*

Evolution in the broad sense (i.e., the descent of all living organisms from common ancestors, and these from the inorganic world) is not an established fact at all, not even a conception based on facts. It is a conception based on materialistic philosophic views, opposed to the older creationistic views, but per definition not more "scientific" than these.

Every textbook author that tries to prove the evolution doctrine supplies a large number of facts which all pertain to variation (i.e., change within the Biblical "kind"), but never prove the transformability of the "kind." These real facts of variation are heartily accepted by the creationist who reserves to himself, however, the right not to extrapolate these facts in an evolutionistic way, but to interpret them in a Biblical way.

It is quite understandable that for many scientists the materialistic view of evolution may seem much more logical and acceptable. A particular scientist may shrink from introducing a "deus ex machina" in his scientific field, but this essentially has nothing to do with the question of which view is correct. "Truth" lies beyond the horizon of natural sciences, on the theological level, and is known by revelation only, not by investigation.

It is therefore incorrect to accuse those who believe in creation as explaining these scientific facts, of being "unscientific." With the same token one can argue that those are "unscientific" who accept scientific facts but also believe in evolution which is not a scientific fact. Evolutionism comprises both the explanation of certain phenomena (repeatable processes), and the description of historical processes (not repeatable but documented). Both of these elements can be accepted as "facts" only if the postulated "repeatable processes" have been observed or experimentally reproduced, and only if the supposedly historical events have been sufficiently documented. On both accounts the evolutionists have completely failed whereas the creationists find confirmation of their views in many scientific respects, as we will see.

Nevertheless most scientists firmly believe in macro-evolution if for no other reason than that they repudiate the creationistic alternative and overestimate the value of the natural-scientific method. One of the foundations of this method is the principal unity of all that varies. Accordingly, when fossils point to variability this must be understood as "consanguinity," otherwise the possibility of a natural-scientific explanation would have to be given up (Van Melsex[2]). I feel this is a gross over-estimation, because we are not interested ultimately in the most elegant method of thinking but in the truth. Thus it is just as possible that the unity of the organisms should be understood as due to a common creative de-

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sign and Designer. This is in itself an "elegant" mode of thought,

Therefore I first will compare, as objectively as possible, the creationistic and the evolutionistic approach as "scientific" methods from the theoretical point of view, and then try to show that even for the scientist who does not know the Word of God, and is not prejudiced by materialism either, it ought to be evident that the evolution doctrine, though being an interesting philosophy, does not fulfill any of the conditions which a scientific hypothesis reasonably should satisfy.

Origins and Basic Assumptions

One objection against creationists is always that they *a priori* assume the existence of a Creator-God, whereas pure natural science is claimed to have no *a priori* assumptions and to be unprejudiced and objective (Van den Bergh[3]). But the same scientist admits[4] that the invariability of natural phenomena is the foundation and *ration d'être* of natural science. But has this invariability been proven irrefutably? No, this is impossible for it is an *a priori* assumption or a premise. It is an axiom of great importance indeed, but still only an assumption.

Moreover, the invariability assumption is not so very self-evident as it seems, because this postulate would in fact exclude the supernatural miracles. Therefore the materialists *a priori* must exclude the existence of God, at least a god who intervenes in nature. This means that both creationism and materialism (c.q. evolutionism) are founded on *a priori* assumptions, viz. either that God exists or that He does not.

Some argue, however, that it is more reasonable to deny the existence of the non-observable than to recognize it. They assert further that, if this premise of the creationists that God exists and that his works are observable in nature, is to have any reason for existence, it should satisfy at least two reasonable demands: (1) a hypothesis must be verifiable, and (2) it should not be more complicated than is necessary for the explanation of the phenomena observed.

When these demands are applied to the premises of creationism it is argued that (a) the existence of God cannot be verified by scientific experiments and no facts can conclusively show that nature is the work of God's hand; (b) it is not necessary to postulate the existence and the activity of a Supreme Being, because all natural phenomena turn out to be explicable in a simple, natural way, Therefore the existence of God should be excluded from our natural-scientific thinking.

Logical as these propositions seem, they are not universally valid. Point (a) for example, simply indicates the limitation of natural science, for who knows whether the observable reality is the only and complete reality? If this were asserted, it would create a third *a priori* assumption of natural science, not to mention a fourth necessary axiom, that our sense-organs and measuring-methods give a concordant picture of total reality.

Point (b) is indeed a very useful postulate in dealing with objects and processes which can be observed and measured at this point in time. It is different, however, when one must deal with natural phenomena which are *not* observable and which have an exceptional character. The best example of this is the origin of life on earth.

One might argue that this is a problem that does not strictly come into the framework of natural science. That would be then an honest recognition of the limitations of natural science, because the origin of life is indeed such an exceptional and unique phenomenon that it is entirely withdrawn from our observation, whereas observation is supposed to be the foundation of the natural-scientific method.

Conversely, one could argue that the origin of life is a natural phenomenon and that examination of it therefore falls under the heading of "natural science." But this would place one on the horns of an inevitable dilemma: on the one side one must assume that life has originated from lifeless matter, and on the other one is convinced that "spontaneous generation" does not exist!

This dilemma cannot be solved. Even if a scientist were capable of creating life in the laboratory, he would have shown only how life *might have* originated, but from the natural-philosophic point of view we would not be an inch closer to the question how life originated *in reality*.

Simplicity of Explanation

When one considers the two demands which a hypothesis should satisfy, I would like to ask: (a) which explanation is "simpler" to assume that life has originated by a unique supernatural creative act, or to assume that life has originated by spontaneous generation—a process in which scientists for the most part do not believe?

And (b) how will we ever be able to verify whether life has originated by creation or by spontaneous generation? This problem by definition cannot be solved scientifically. At best one might show how life might have originated. But even so he could do no more than to imitate the environment in which this origination is supposed to have taken place and then to wait (perhaps for centuries) to see whether life would originate therein.

But in reality it is fairly well known that a great technical ability and a high level of intellect would be needed to produce life in a test-tube. If living protoplasm were ever to be synthesized, then natural scientists would simply have amassed more evidence to show that life could have originated only by the activity of a great Intellect.

This section may therefore be concluded by asserting that: (a) the simplest explanation may be the creationistic one, and because of the limitations of natural science a scientist does not have the right or reason to reject this explanation formally. And (b) an explanation of a natural phenomenon can be right although verification within the framework of natural science may be impossible. This shows that creationism covers a larger domain than evolutionism because it investigates beyond the natural into the supernatural—the latter not by imagination but by revelation.

Evolutionary Dogma

Strict attention will now be given to the scientific character of evolutionism. In the title of this paper, evolution is called a "doctrine," and perhaps this is the best way to describe it because it is a dogma which is taught with an appeal to credulity. Delfgaauw[5] has discussed the problem whether evolutionism may be called a thesis, a hypothesis or a theory.

Evolution cannot be a thesis because a thesis must be proven, but the evolution doctrine is unproven and also unprovable. At best you can cite arguments of probability, but you cannot prove that a supposed historical process which is not documented really has taken place. The supposed consequences of evolution are documented but not the process of evolution itself.

Is the evolution doctrine a hypothesis? A hypothesis serves to correlate certain observed phenomena, and indeed this is also a function of the evolution doctrine. But there is a great difference. In science, hypotheses have only a temporal existence—they disappear as soon as more satisfying hypotheses are found. But the evolution doctrine has no alternative in natural science. Even when a great volume of data is found contradicting this doctrine it is not given up, because the materialists have nothing else. They flatly refuse to look further than their field of vision, and in some respect they are right because it would make them metaphysicists, natural-philosophers, or even theologians.

But when they refuse this, do they have the right then to, look for an explanation which by their own admission evidently cannot be given within the natural-scientific framework? And when they give an explanation, can it possibly be anything else than also a philosophy, albeit a bad one? Delfgaauw recognizes this in some way. He shows that the evolution doctrine cannot be a hypothesis, because it cannot be replaced by another one. Therefore, it is not a theory either because a theory is a way of thinking (about some field of science) which also should be replaceable by another one, which for the materialist is impossible.

Therefore Delfgaauw concludes that the evolution doctrine is a "postulate," i.e., a demand made on thinking such that if man wants to think about a certain domain of reality, he ought to think according to this demand or ought not to think. This is an honest but all too characteristic view for a materialist; he simply refuses to think in another way than in that of materialism. But materialism is nothing else than a kind of philosophy, and why should one not have the right to accept another philosophy, viz. creationism?

When it is once recognized that evolutionism does not fall strictly under the heading of "natural science," one is apt to recognize many aspects in which evolutionism turns out to be actually unscientific. It has been noted that the evolution doctrine offers no alternative within natural science. Therefore, it is a materialistic postulate. But is it a *"scientific"* postulate? A truly scientific postulate must satisfy these. six criteria:

(1) It must be in accordance with the principal laws of mathematics and natural science.

(2) It must not be more complicated than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena observed.

(3) It must give rise to conclusions which can be controlled by further (experimental) observations.

(4) No data may be known which are principally at variance with the conception.

(5) It is acceptable only if alternative hypotheses have been shown to be either wrong or less satisfactory.

(6) Its reliability is inversely proportional to the number of unproven postulates on which it is founded.

How far does the evolution doctrine satisfy these demands? Let us follow them point by point.

(1) *A scientific conception must be in accordance with the principal laws of mathematics and natural science.* Evolution shows a painful lack of coordination between the various fields of the exact sciences. It is a well-known phenomenon that every scientist senses the difficulties in the evolution doctrine on his own field, but he imagines that the doctrine is sufficiently supported by other disciplines. Therefore every biologist should know that the doctrine is at variance with main principles of mathematics, physics, and geology.

Mathematics: In 1966 a symposium of mathematicians and biologists was held[6] to discuss the statistical incompatibility between the uniqueness and complexity of the gene and a theory of natural selection of random mutations. It seems that the mathematicians did not understand the biologists and *vice versa.* I agree with Salisbury[7] that only Drs. M. Eden and M. P. Schützenberger really seemed to understand the problem. These two men agreed that the evolutionary origin and development of life was highly improbable!

Physics: The same discrepancy is felt between physics and biology. Physicists discovered as a principal law in the universe the second law of thermodynamics. They assert that in a closed system (i.e. a system in which no exchange of energy with the outer world is possible) the entropy (the inclination to convert kinetic energy into heat) tends to increase. It is known that this law has a universal validity in that it explains the inclination of the universe to a lower level of order and organization. This is evidenced by the "running-down" of the universe and in the break-down of complex stars and of radio-active metals.

This is in striking contrast with another principle (evolution) invented by biologists, which implies an inclination of the universe to a higher level of order and organization. Nobody has satisfactorily solved this discrepancy. It has indeed been objected that the law of entropy is only valid for a closed system while in an open system (as the earth) entropy may temporarily decrease. But first, there can be no reason not to consider the universe as a closed system. Secondly, such a decrease indeed is only temporary and cannot account for a principle of such a general (supposed) validity in the whole universe as evolution.

Bok[8] tried to solve this problem for the origin of life by assuming that higher organisms have a higher degree of entropy (i.e. a lower energy level) than lower organisms and lifeless matter. In this way he tried to harmonize evolution and entropy by arguing that entropy leads to the origin of larger macromolecules because these have a lower energy level; therefore the origin of life would have been inevitable. But this equates the largest macromolecules with living organisms—a view which lacks all comprehension of the extreme high specificity of living cells.

Only entropy is a leading principle and it involves the disorganization of nature, not evolutionary advance. The uptake and storage of energy is always temporal, and often cyclical (e.g. the ontogeneses and decline of the human body), and ends always in break-down, decay and death. We also observe this in biology: the genetic pool is subject to mutations, but these are nearly always harmful for the organism and lead to a lower viability and fertility. In the same way cultivated forms always fall back to their original natural state when they are left to themselves. The supposed evolutionary history of man is one great proof of degeneration, not of evolution; the *oldest* human remains known (found in Calaveras and Castenedolo) are entirely similar to present man.

Geology: A third area of discrepancy is known between geology and evolutionism. When Lyell's principle of uniformitarianism is understood only as the general validity of natural laws nothing is wrong. But when it is propagated as in complete contrast with a catastrophic theory (Cuvier), as was intended by Lyell, we should be careful.

It is admitted that all earth strata must have arisen by inundations, and that perhaps every fossil owes its origin to a catastrophe. Under normal conditions no fossils arise. What are the glacial ages other than a kind of cataclysm? Have the mass graves of the mammoths in Siberia, and of the fishes and molluscs in the Alps, arisen under "uniformitarian" conditions? And how can one explain the reversed sequence of earth strata over thousands of square miles (e.g. in Montana, Canada, and elsewhere)?

Uniformitarianism is the fundamental basis of all dating-methods; but is it a sound basis? It is known that the velocity of sedimentation is very different. And as to the radio-active methods, how can one know whether the lead in a rock formation is either all radiogenic or partly primordial? How can it be shown that the cosmic radiation was always uniform? This obviously cannot be true by the evolutionist's own admission because he argues that, for the origin of life, completely different atmospheric conditions were needed than are found at present. Indications of luxuriant polar vegetations in earlier ages point to different atmospheric conditions, while volcanic eruptions are also known to change these conditions considerably. All these changes influence the cosmic radiations and confuse our datings of the rocks.

(2) A scientific conception must not be more complicated than necessary for the explanation of the phenomena observed. This demand leads to the many auxiliary hypotheses which have been introduced into geology, taxonomy, genetics, paleontology, etc. to make the evolution doctrine more acceptable.

The geologist has for instance to deal with the following problems: (a) in Montana a reversed sequence of earth strata is found over thousands of square miles without any trace of a cataclysm; how is this explained? (b) Nowhere more than two or three geological "periods" are found above each other. It is claimed that the whole geological column comprises a depth of about 100 miles, whereas the geological strata seldom have a depth of more than half a mile. (c) There is not

a single independent proof that the Devonian, for example, at different places indeed elapsed at the same time. (d) No place on earth shows in strata the evolutionary origin of any animal or plant kind. (e) It has been publicly admitted that the notion of index fossils is based on a circular reasoning: they indicate the age of a rock in which they are found, whereas they themselves are dated by the rock to which they belong. Can all these problems be solved, or is there possibly something wrong with the geological column?

The taxonomist also knows his dilemma. His taxonomical system has become interesting because it would reflect the evolution of living organisms, but at the same time he has to realize that all the organisms in his system are still alive, and he must admit that they have not descended from each other but from supposed common ancestors. Therefore he has to introduce an auxiliary hypothesis to explain why many primitive forms remained more or less unchanged, whereas others underwent a rapid and drastic evolution.

The evolutionary geneticist must evade the following established facts: (a) species turn out to be not transformable; (b) nearly all mutations are harmful; (c) the production of specialized organs and organisms by natural selection of random mutations is statistically unacceptable. The evolutionist can surmount these obstacles for the evolution doctrine only by unproven and unprobable auxiliary hypotheses.

Such hypotheses are also needed by the paleontologist to evade his evolutionary problems, such as (a) why are no intermediate and transitional forms known? (b) why are no nascent organs known? (c) why are the fossils mutually as discontinuous as the present forms? (d) why is there hardly an (if any) fossil in the Precambrian? (although three-fourths of the supposed life history must have elapsed before the Cambrian!) (e) where do the enormous mass graves come from? (f) where do all those Invertebrate phyla in the Cambrian so suddenly come from? What was the origin of the Mammals in the Tertiary? Where did the Angiosperms suddenly come from? (g) How is it possible that species which, according to the theory, are separated by intervals of millions of years as to their period of existence, nevertheless are sometimes found together in one and the same rock (such as supposed impressions of *Homo* and *Dinosaurus* in the Paluxy River (Texas), and the Wadjak skulls found by Dubois in the same stratum as *Pithecanthropus*, etc.)?

(3) *A scientific conception must give rise to conclusions which can be controlled by further (experimental) observations.* I now mention other aspects of the experimental approach in which the doctrine has failed. Ecological and crossing experiments have shown that no variation transgresses the borders of the kinds. Mutations may be advantageous in a very specific environment, but they are nearly always degenerative. Selected hybrids after free intrabreeding return to the parental types, cultivated forms to their original state.

A large problem for evolutionists is also that no macromutations with a high selective value have been found. Also mutation occurring in existing genes does not lead to the origination of new genes. Adaptation leads to variation not to transformation. Natural selection tends to eliminate mutations, not to favor them and natural selection with any evolutionary consequences has been observed only where man has drastically created new conditions with a heavy selection pressure.

Spontaneous mutations never can account for the origination of complicated organs or specialized organisms. Moreover, complicated organs are useful only if they are complete and the intermediate forms would be eliminated (nascent organs have never been found). The same mutations arise many times in the history of the species and disappear as often as they arise, making the species oscillate around the wild type. These points are some of the results of the experimental approach but they in no wise confirm the concept of macro-evolution.

(4) *No data may be known which are fundamentally at variance with the conception.* Of course many of the problems summed up in the former sections are contradictions to the evolution doctrine. Many others might be added: (a) The law of recapitulation (saying that the embryological development of an organism recapitulates its phylogeny), once a pillar of the evolution doctrine, has been shown to be nothing else than the deceit of Haeckel. (b) Of all the numerous so-called “vestigial organs” the functions gradually have become known, so that they lose their value as “proofs” for evolution; moreover, if they exist, they can be interpreted as evidence for retrogression (degeneration), not for evolution. (c) The life story of separate species exhibits degeneration, not evolution; Man is the best example, as the oldest forms are similar to present man, but afterwards many degenerative types arose such as the Neanderthaler.

(d) The origination of protozoans or insects before their predators is impossible. In a short time they would have covered every square inch of the earth with a thick layer of organisms. This problem of the natural equilibrium is too often neglected; e.g., the viruses (the simplest “living” forms) could not arise before the higher organisms on which they are parasitic. Consider the many plants and animals which are completely dependent on each other and think of the natural

food cycles and chemical cycles. Then ask, how came this all into being?

(e) Paleobotanics is in fact one great problem for the evolutionist: he sees complex forms often appear earlier than the so-called simpler ones; without a trace of ancestors. He often finds supposed "higher" and "lower" features in one plant. Furthermore, he knows many modern forms which are (nearly) identical with far removed fossil specimens (sometimes even large time gaps are found between so-called related groups). He now finds some of the anatomical features which characterized one particular group to be present also in so-called not-related groups. The whole phylogeny of the Angiosperms in fact is a great mystery[9].

(f) The supposed evolution of man is contrary to the archeological and historical data. If mankind really is as old as we are told, why has it never before built up a proper civilization? How is it possible that such a civilization very suddenly originated in the Near East only 6000 years ago, and that this civilization since has never become more civilized in fact? The center of civilization has simply moved gradually to the west.

(5) *A scientific conception is only then sufficiently acceptable if alternative hypotheses have been shown to be either wrong or less acceptable.* We could suggest two alternatives for evolutionism, viz. theistic evolutionism ("God has created by means of the process of evolution") and strict creationism. Theistic evolutionism[10] is a poor attempt to reconciliate evolutionism with the Bible. Macro-evolution as it is defined is a closed system in which God is not needed.

Theistic evolutionists confuse creation with providence, and they make God the prisoner of the natural processes He created, because these processes elapse of themselves. A strict acceptance of evolutionism makes a belief in God, in sin, and in redemption unnecessary, as Huxley often triumphantly pointed out. Theistic evolutionists have surrendered to this doctrine, seemingly without calculating the consequences.

Only a fundamentalistic creationism can be a serious alternative of evolutionism. But only a few people know that creationists indeed can give equally, or even more, acceptable explanations for many natural phenomena than do evolutionists. In many disciplines so-called "proofs" for evolution have been given. These are generally based on circular reasoning. If one supposes evolution theory is true, certain phenomena become apprehensible and these phenomena are then fostered as arguments for evolution.

But in reality they are not arguments favoring evolution, because they also become apprehensible when one assumes creation. For example, the morphological correspondences between the organisms can be understood by common descent, but also by a common design by a Creator. A common typological plan, e.g., can be very useful for a corresponding manner of life, and this could very well be a reason why God created many animals according to a similar plan. Moreover, the descent theory is not consistent, for it often supposes suspected "convergences," which are better understood by a common Creator than by evolution (e.g. Mammals vs. Marsupials; the Vertebrate eye vs. the Cephalopod eye).

The same is seen in taxonomy: the taxonomic system may point to common descent or to common design. As a scientist, I prefer the latter, because if evolution had taken place, I could not explain the very distinct separations between the species. In the case of evolution I would have expected a much less discontinuous transition between the species, and I also would wonder how the lower organisms could evolve from the older ancestors without any important alteration whereas the higher organisms evolved from the same ancestors, undergoing many changes. In fact the taxonomic system has nothing to do with a supposed pedigree.

The same is true for the so-called vestigial organs, if any really exist. They might point to descent or to a common creative design. Here again I prefer the latter because vestigial organs, if they are at all "vestigial," are easily thought of as degeneration not evolution. They would be classed as later deviations from the creative design.

The Noachian flood may also account for several of the so-called "proofs" for evolution. Paleontology and geology either teach us the history of life or an arrangement of sediments and organisms during the flood. It will suffice to refer to the work of Morris and Whitcomb[11] which shows that the arguments for the geological column are too weak to maintain it. But all these arguments, on the other hand, are easily understood by accepting creation and the flood. Also the geograpical distribution of the organisms can be well explained as having taken place after the flood. It is not my point to summarize extensively all the evidence for creation. I am simply asking whether evolutionism as a doctrine is scientifically more acceptable than creationism. Here genetics has helped the creationists because it has shown nothing else than that species are variable but not transformable.

(6) *The reliability of a scientific conception is inversely proportional to the number of unproven postulates on which it is founded.* This is rather a feature of, than a demand for, a scientific conception. But the point is this: when the unproven foundations of a scientific conception are too numerous, one wonders if that conception actually deserves to be called "scientific."

To believe in evolution it is necessary to rely on a number of indications from various disciplines, which may be interpreted as supporting the evolutionistic view but which equally well, or even better, can be understood by the creationistic view.

But it is also necessary for the evolutionists to accept a number of premises which are very essential for his view, which are not proven, for which there is hardly any evidence, and which sometimes are completely improbable. In the former century this was not a problem because the defenders of evolutionism had the firm confidence that the necessary evidence for their presumptions would sooner or later certainly be obtained.

However, the pillars of evolutionism have not been supported at all during the last hundred years, but have been weakened consistently by the newer evidence. In that sense evolutionism is but an interesting anachronism. It fitted in a time when people believed in "generatio spontanea," whereas one now feels it a dilemma to believe in a spontaneous generation that cannot occur. It was also the time that the uniformitarianism of Lyell successfully could join issue with the catastrophe theories, whereas we now know that geologists do little else than study cataclysms.

Evolution arose in the time that three-fourths of the suggested life history was completely missing in the fossil record, because it took place before the Cambrian and the scholars trusted that the Precambrian would yield a huge amount of fossils illustrating this lacking part. But even today hardly a single undisputed Precambrian fossil exists. This means that, because all Invertebrate phyla are represented in the Cambrian, evolutionists have to accept on the basis of faith, without any evidence, that all viruses, bacteria, plants, and animals are really interrelated. Secondly, they must assert that the Metazoans have originated from the Protozoans (which on other grounds is hardly believable). Thirdly, they must trust that the Invertebrate phyla are interrelated, and that the Vertebrates descended from the Invertebrates.

Evolutionists base their views on faith, and thus do not have the right to reproach the creationists for their belief in a Creator. One need not espouse theistic evolutionism either, because we are not convinced at all that the earth strata represent vast geological periods. It is an established fact that every known rock (from Cambrian to Quaternary) has been found to lie somewhere directly on the Precambrian. Nowhere has a representative part of the supposed geological column been found, while on several places the strata are arranged in a reversed sequence without a trace of any secondary cataclysm.

In this way we could go on mentioning many unfounded evolutionary assertions which have not been supported in the last century. It should be no wonder therefore that young scientists in particular raise questions and feel doubts as to the validity of evolutionism. It would be unreal, however, to expect that finally evolutionism would be rejected. As long as most scientists refuse to accept that there is an alternative supplied by the Word of God, they will cling to their unacceptable and refuted doctrine which they hold as their faith—their own religion.

Conclusion

Two points have been stressed: First, that on merely logical and philosophical grounds it is wrong to say that evolutionism is more "scientific" than creationism. From the objective, unprejudiced point of view they are both equivalent alternatives. Secondly, however, on natural-scientific grounds evolutionism does not satisfy any of the demands that should be made of it. As to the facts known at the moment it must be clear that creationism should be favored as being more consistent with our knowledge of nature. Of course, Christian faith actually does not need scientific proofs for its consistency, but on the, other hand it is important to recognize that creationism is not based on blind faith neglecting the irrevocable evidence. Actually, its foundations in scientific respect are better and firmer than those of materialism. To the individual that believes every word of Scripture to be the infallible Word of God, this will be no surprise.

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